Key takeaways
- The FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center recorded 12,368 real estate fraud complaints and $275,110,419 in reported losses in 2025, up from 9,359 complaints and $173,586,820 in 2024.
- Business email compromise, which includes fake wire instructions sent from compromised or spoofed accounts, accounted for $3,046,598,558 in reported losses across all industries in 2025.
- TREC advises license holders to talk with clients before they wire money, and tells consumers not to rely on emailed instructions without verifying them with their broker or agent.
- When a fraudulent wire is discovered, the FBI says time is of the essence: contact the bank to request a recall and file a complaint at ic3.gov.
Every residential closing moves a large amount of money, and most of the instructions for moving it travel by email. That combination is why the FBI, TREC and title industry groups keep warning about wire fraud in real estate. For a brokerage with dozens or hundreds of agents, the practical question is not whether agents have heard the warning, but whether the same protective steps happen on every file.
This article summarizes what the FBI's 2025 Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) report shows, what TREC tells license holders, and a set of controls a managing broker can put into the transaction workflow.
What the 2025 IC3 numbers show
The 2025 IC3 Annual Report lists 12,368 real estate fraud complaints with $275,110,419 in reported losses. That compares with 9,359 complaints and $173,586,820 in 2024, and 9,521 complaints and $145,243,348 in 2023. By our calculation from those figures, reported losses rose about 58% and complaints about 32% from 2024 to 2025.
Two cautions apply. First, IC3 defines this category broadly as loss of funds from a real estate investment or fraud involving rental or timeshare property, so it is not only closing-related wire fraud. Second, these are losses reported to IC3, not the total amount lost.
The report tracks business email compromise (BEC) separately. IC3 describes BEC as scams that compromise email accounts and other communication channels, such as phone numbers and virtual meeting applications, to conduct unauthorized transfers of funds. Across all industries, BEC produced 24,768 complaints and $3,046,598,558 in reported losses in 2025. In Texas, IC3 recorded 97,912 complaints and $1,825,636,181 in losses across all crime types, second among states on both measures.
How closings get targeted
The IC3 report includes real estate examples from 2025. In one, people closing on a home received an email impersonating their attorneys and wired more than $449,000 to a fraudulent account. In another, a senior citizen received a compromised email from the "title company" with instructions that directed more than $1.3 million to a fraudulent account. In both cases the FBI's Recovery Asset Team was able to act after the fraud was reported, and the funds were frozen or placed on hold.
The FBI's BEC guidance uses a closing as its example: a homebuyer receives a message that looks like it is from the title company, with instructions for wiring a down payment. The FBI's advice is to verify payment requests in person or by calling a number you look up yourself, to verify any change in account numbers or payment procedures, and to be especially wary when someone is pressing you to act quickly.
Fraud also targets sellers. TREC has noted that it is assisting the Texas Land Title Association in educating license holders about seller impersonation, where prime targets include vacant land, vacation and second homes, rental properties, and any property where the tax mailing address differs from the owner's address.
What TREC tells license holders
TREC's consumer alert on wire transfer scams says that before a client wires money for an escrow deposit or to close, license holders should talk with their clients to ensure funds go to the correct recipient and account. It also says consumers should not rely on instructions sent by email without contacting their broker or sales agent to verify them, since emails may be hijacked.
That guidance puts the agent in the verification loop, which is also where a brokerage's supervision duties apply. Our earlier article on TREC Rule 535.2 broker supervision policies covers how written policies and documented oversight fit together.
A wire-safety control checklist for brokerages
These controls are drawn from the FBI and TREC guidance above. Adapt them with your counsel, title partners and E&O carrier.
- Written policy. State that agents and staff never send, forward or change wiring instructions, and that clients should get instructions only from the escrow agent and confirm them by phone.
- Early client notice. Deliver a written wire-fraud warning when the client signs a representation agreement or the contract is executed, and again before earnest money and closing funds are due. Record that it was delivered.
- Independent call-back. Before any wire, the client calls the title company at a number taken from a trusted source, not from the email that contains the instructions. The agent confirms the call happened and notes it on the file.
- Red-flag escalation. Changed instructions, last-minute urgency, new email addresses or slightly misspelled domains go to the managing broker the same day.
- Account security. Require multi-factor authentication on agent and staff email, as the FBI recommends, and remove access promptly when someone leaves.
- Seller identity checks. For vacant land, second homes, rentals and listings where the tax mailing address differs, confirm the seller's identity with the title company before marketing begins.
- Incident steps on one page. If a client may have wired funds to the wrong account, they should contact their bank immediately to request a recall and file a complaint at ic3.gov with full transaction details, as IC3 advises. The agent notifies the title company, lender and managing broker.
Making the controls repeatable
A policy only helps if it happens on every file. That is easier when each control is a dated task on the transaction: wire notice delivered at contract, call-back confirmed before earnest money, second notice before closing. When those tasks have owners and due dates, a managing broker can see which files are missing a step before funds move, instead of finding out afterward.
Training matters too. Short refreshers that use real examples, such as the IC3 cases above, help agents recognize the patterns the FBI describes: impersonated title companies and attorneys, changed account numbers and pressure to act fast.
This article is general information, not legal advice. Fraud patterns and guidance change, so confirm current practices with your counsel, title partners and E&O carrier. For more guides like this, browse PulseHubCo Insights.
Frequently asked questions
How much did real estate fraud cost victims in 2025?
The FBI's IC3 2025 Annual Report lists 12,368 real estate fraud complaints and $275,110,419 in reported losses. These are reported losses, and the category also includes rental, timeshare and investment fraud.
What should a client do if they wired closing funds to the wrong account?
IC3 says time is of the essence. The client should immediately contact their bank to request a recall of the funds and file a complaint at ic3.gov with full transaction details. The agent should notify the title company, lender and managing broker.
What does TREC recommend license holders do about wire fraud?
TREC advises license holders to talk with clients before they wire money for an escrow deposit or closing, to make sure funds go to the correct recipient and account. Consumers should verify any emailed instructions with their broker or agent.
Which listings are higher risk for seller impersonation?
TREC, assisting the Texas Land Title Association, identified vacant land and investment properties such as vacation homes, second homes and rentals, plus any property where the tax mailing address differs from the owner's address.